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I
n Saint Augustine’s De Trinitate, the distinction between
oikonomia and theologia was used in the development of his
trinitarian metaphysics.^ In this major work Augustine deliber-
ately attempted to show the reasonableness of the Catholic doctrine
of the Trinity over against pagan derision of the idea of three-in-one.
^
He did this while making a polemic against the Arians. This polemic
was carried through without falling into the trinitarian metaphysics of
either Eunomius or Sabellius.^ In this difficult pastoral task of the
late fourth and early fifth centuries, the distinction between oikonomia
and theoiogia gave precision to the arguments used against these
various alternatives concerning the doctrine of God."^ Nevertheless,
in recent years there have been some who have suggested that this
distinction in Augustine’s trinitarian thinking is one of the root causes
for the doctrine of the Trinity’s irrelevance in the Western world. For
instance, Colin Gunton has noted that while trinitarian categories
remain paramount in the theology and worship of Eastern Ortho-
doxy, in the West the doctrine of he Trinity has come under ques-
tion.^ Gunton also points to the distinction between oikonomia and
theoiogia as being instrumental in the profound suspicion that has
arisen in the intellectual leadership of our times concerning the exist-
ence and knowability of God.^
One important moment in the discussion concerning Augustine’s
use of this distinction occurs in the work of Karl Rahner. Rahner,
who asserts that proper theological talk concerning the Trinity must
begin and end with the revealed God pro nobis, points back to Au-
gustine as the one who ensured that the Western tradition would
“begin with the one God, the one divine essence as a whole, and
only afterwards does it see God as three in persons.”^ According to
Rahner, the result of this focus on God in se over against God pro
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nobis is that the treatise of the Trinity loses its interest for the “reli-
gious mind” and talk about God is now primarily centred “on the one
divinity”:
As a result the treatise becomes quite philosophical and abstract
and refers hardly at all to salvation history. It speaks of the necessary
metaphysical properties of God, and not very explicitly of God as
experienced in salvation history in his free relations to his creatures.®
Rahner’s solution to this trend is to equate the economic Trinity
with the immanent Trinity.®
This solution has engendered a great deal of discussion quite
apart from Augustine’s role in these developments. There are those
who judge “Rahner’s rule” as a necessary corrective that brings West-
ern Christianity’s talk about God back to the biblically revealed plan
of salvation in history. Others conclude that this solution sacrifices
God’s freedom and makes God dependent on creation. William J.
Hill, while applauding Rahner’s attempt to ground the doctrine of
God in the Missions of the Persons of the Trinity, concludes that the
necessary analogical nature of language when applied to God en-
sures that equating God pro nobis with God in se will always remain
conceptually problematic.^®
Rahner’s comments about Augustine’s role in making God pro
nobis become secondary in the Western doctrine of God have gen-
erated negative reactions. Edmund Hill is one scholar who disa-
grees with Rahner. Hill judges that Augustine did, in fact, begin his
reflections on the Trinity with the temporal Missions of the divine
Persons. Edmund Hill claims:
(i) that the early books of the De Trinitate are developed entirely
from the New Testament; (ii) that there is a persistence throughout
the whole work of the doctrine of the temporal missions; and (iii) that
the doctrine of “appropriation” is far more subtle than Rahner
allows.
In another place, Edmund Hill states that the “sublime irrelevance
which has afflicted the doctrine of the Trinity” is not caused by Au-
gustine’s alleged emphasis on the immanent Trinity at the expense
of the economic. Rather, it is caused by subsequent generations
who ignored Augustine’s discussion of the divine Missions in books
11-lV of his De Trinitate}^ /According to Hill, these particular books of
the De Trinitate could have provided a bridge between the dominant
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inamanent theology that was fashionable after Augustine and the
* economic theology that was dominant in the theology of the ante-
Nicene fathers from Justin to Tertullian.^^ Augustine attempted to
correct the subordinationism that was inherent in these older eco-
nomic models of God while conceptually giving priority to the con-
nection of God with the divine missions in time.^"^ In light of Edmund
Hill’s comments, this paper will focus its analysis on Books II-IV of
Augustine’s De Trinitate.
Faith and Truth in Time and Eternity
In the preface to book IV of De Trinitate, Augustine makes a
distinction between knowledge of earthly and celestial things and
knowledge of oneself:
But they are certainly better who prefer the knowledge of themselves
to this knowledge; and a mind to which even its own weakness is
known, is more deserving of praise than one which, knowing
nothing of this, searches out the courses of the stars in order to learn
them, or to retain the knowledge ofthem it has already acquired, but
is itself ignorant of the course by which it must proceed to reach its
own true health and strength.
Augustine’s purpose for making this distinction between the
knowledge of the external world and the knowledge of the self is a
pastoral one.^® Augustine is concerned for the “health and strength”
of the reader. The reason why knowledge of one’s self, even one’s
weakness, is superior to knowing the “walls of the world, the founda-
tions of the earth, and the heights of the heavens” is that, by this
knowledge, one acquires sorrow; “the sorrow arising from his wan-
dering away from the desire of his own true country, and its founder,
his own blessed God.”^^ The inward gaze that gains knowledge of
the self ideally arrives at the realization that the self is in need. The
self needs God.
This universal human need for God is described by means of
categories that combine certain existential themes with metaphysi-
cal motifs. Augustine writes: “For the essence of God... has nothing
changeable, neither in eternity, nor in truth nor in will: because there
the truth is eternal, love is eternal; there the love is true, eternity true;
and there eternity is loved, truth is loved.”'® When the human need
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for God is spoken in these categories, it quickly becomes evident that
there is a huge gulf separating human life from divine life. According
to Augustine, without Christ this chasm is experienced either as despair
or as hubris. God reveals his grace through his Son to avoid these
two possibilities so that: “through despair we should not dare to be
lifted up to Him”; and so that “lest being proud...of our own merits...and
fail the more in our own strength.
The solution for these two negative alternatives is found in God’s
oikonomia. Augustine locates the Christian resolution of these two
alternatives by quoting St. Paul: “But God commends his charity
towards us, because when as yet we were sinners, Christ died for us.
Much more, now that we are justified by his blood, shall we be saved
through him from the wrath. Augustine applies this “solution” in a
way that resonates with the human problem that was previously es-
tablished. There is a disjunction between present human life and the
life of God. Human beings are separated from God by their nature
and by their sinful lives. The chasm between the human and the
divine is bridged by the Incarnation of Jesus which impacts on the
human situation in ways that address this particular human prob-
lem: “...by nature we are men, and by sin we are not just. God,
therefore, having been made a just man, intercedes for sinful
man...and having been made a sharer of our mortality. He has made
us a sharer of His divinity.
In the anthropology which arises in this part of De Trinitate, Au-
gustine locates and defines the nature of humanity as belonging to
the outer part of an individual and places sin in the realm of the inner.
Both, however, are symptomatic of the gulf between God and hu-
manity. Augustine then invests a large amount of literary energy
outlining the soteriological implications of this differentiation between
the inner and the outer parts of the human being. This distinction
leads Augustine to conclude eventually that while there is one death
and resurrection for Jesus, there are two deaths and two resurrec-
tions for Christian saints.^^ There is a death of the soul that can be
distinguished from physical death, and there is a resurrection of the
inner person that is different from the final resurrection.
The differentiation between the soul and the body gives a par-
ticular character to the language of sin and salvation as applied to
each: “But the death of the soul is godlessness, and the death of the
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body corruptibility...For just as the soul dies when God abandons it,
so too does the body when the soul abandons it....”^^ In this way,
Augustine sets up a conceptual analogy between God and the soul.
A soul without God is analogous to a body without a soul. The dis-
tinction between the inner and the outer person is an important con-
sideration when Augustine compares the place of saints in eternity
with their situation in time. In the resurrection “we shall be like Him,
I
since we shall see Him as He is.”^"^ In the meantime, “as long as the
corruptible body is a load upon the soul...the soul is brought back to
I life by penance, and in the body that is still mortal, the renewal of life
begins by faith.... When Augustine contemplated the Christian life
he distinguished between the inner and the outer, between time and
I
eternity, and as we shall see, he also made a distinction between faith
! and truth. This is different from the Greek fathers who examined
being and life in relation to death and decay.
In the disjunction between time and eternity, Augustine recog-
nizes that a Mediator is necessary who conforms to the human situ-
ation in time:
Since we were...incapable of grasping eternal things, and the stains
' of sin, contracted by our love of earthly things...from the root of our
mortality, pressed heavily upon us; it was necessary for us to be
cleansed. But we could not be cleansed so as to be tempered with
eternal things...For there is an immense distance between health
and disease, and unless the healing process... is adapted to the
disease, it does not lead to perfect health.^^
The Mission of God is directed to our lives in time which is exis-
tentially appropriated through faith.
However, in the demarcation between time and eternity, faith is
given a role that fits these differentiations. In Book IV, Augustine
describes faith by beginning and ending with a quotation from “one
of those who were formerly regarded as wise men by the Greeks”:
“As eternity is to that which has a beginning, so truth is to faith. It
thus becomes a major conceptual problem for Augustine to relate
faith which begins in time and is mutable with eternity which is im-
mutable.^^ Since eternity is conceptualized in terms of immutability
and faith is something that begins and changes, Augustine needs to
make an analogy to explain the place of faith in relation to eternal
things: “as the truth follows the faith, so may eternity follow mortal-
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This analogy, however, is one that establishes an hierarchical
relationship between faith and truth: “...we adapt the faith of our be-
lief to the things which have a beginning, just as we hope for the
truth of contemplation in eternal things....
One effect of this analogy is that it lessens the relative impor-
tance given to the oikonomia. Keeping in mind the aforementioned
gulf between mortality and eternity a question arises concerning the
quality which separates faith and truth. Augustine is aware of the
dangers of having too great a rift between faith and truth. Although
he is content to set up an hierarchy between faith and truth, Augus-
tine quickly disavows any discordant relationship between the two.^^
The importance of this proviso is illustrated by the fact that he re-
peats this thought almost immediately:
We had to be cleansed, therefore, in order that we might come to
the beginning which would last forever, so that there would not be
one beginning for us in faith and another in truth. Nor would we be
able to pass from the condition of having a beginning to eternal
things, if He who is eternal had not brought us over to His eternity
by becoming one with us through our own beginning.^^
The reason why faith and truth are not discordant with one an-
other is grounded in the Incarnation of Jesus Christ. In the above
quotation, Augustine adds that just as the gulf between mortality
and eternity is bridged by the Mediator, so is the difference between
faith and truth. Once again, the pastoral problem tackled by Augus-
tine is answered via the oikonomia and once again the particular
shape of the answer is determined by the assumptions set up in the
question itself. Thus, while the difference between faith and truth is
bridged through the Incarnation of the Son, there still remains an
hierarchical relationship between faith and truth. This relationship is
of the same nature as the hierarchy between that which has a begin-
ning and that which is eternal.
A clearer understanding of how Augustine perceived faith will
arise from how Augustine relates faith to other elements of his theol-
ogy. Truth and the eternity that awaits believers have their own
characteristic shape in Augustine’s description. The truth that
supercedes faith in eternity is distinguished from and is derived from
the Truth that is eternity. This truth that stems from the Truth is
described through the categories of correct knowing or correct see-
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ing. Using Scripture, Augustine explains that our faith will be changed
into truth when, by sight, we will know the Truth: “Now this is eternal
life, that they may know thee, the only true God, and him whom thou
hast sent, Jesus Christ. When our faith by seeing shall be trans-
formed into truth.... By placing the discussion of truth in terms of
the categories seeing and knowing and then by placing truth and
faith in an hierarchical relationship to one another, Augustine gives
faith a particular character. It follows, therefore, that faith is also in
an hierarchical relationship with seeing and knowing. This, how-
ever, does not mean faith is somehow in opposition to knowledge.^®
The existential and pastoral concerns of Augustine’s time and
place were of such a nature that he sought a way to express the
Christian faith within the distinctions between the inner and outer,
and between time and eternity. Jesus Christ was descibed as the
Mediator between these various distinctions. However, when Augus-
tine attempted to describe the solution to the problems caused by
these distinctions, he used language which was in keeping with the
language that expressed the problem in the first place.
This caused a problem when Augustine attempted to describe
the relationship between the concepts of faith and truth. As we have
already noted, he himself recognized the necessity to lessen the dis-
tance he had already established between faith and truth. These
dynamics illustrate the problem that is being addressed in this paper.
On the one hand, the evidence seems to bear the assertion that
Augustine does indeed stress the oikonomia. This is especially the
case when he looks for a solution to the problem of how to describe
the relationship between human beings and God. However, when
he expresses this solution he does so by using categories that ap-
pear to set up an inherent distance from the oikonomia. Therefore,
the evidence also hints at the possibility that Augustine might, in
some way, be sacrificing the oikonomia for considerations of the
theoiogia. These issues can be further clarified by examining an-
other pastoral concern of Augustine’s day.
Contra Arius
How does one make sense of one’s life within the contingencies
of time and space? One way is to search for a coherence that is able
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somehow to bring these together within a meaningful whole. This
existential question and search dominated the energies of Augus-
tine’s contemporaries. Related to this search was the fear that per-
haps the only power which gave life any coherence or unity was that
which could be found in chronos. Chronos, however, eventually de-
vours all her own children.
The Hellenic answer to these existential concerns was found in
the “oneness” of God who dwells in eternity, outside the realm of
chronos. This answer, for it to be existentially comforting, is one that
calls for a mediator between the realm of eternity and the realm of
chronos. While God might be coherent, unified and safe from the
vicissitudes of time, creation is not. In Greek thought, the Logos was
often identified as such a mediator. For example, Philo of Alexandria
saw the Logos fulfilling this mediating function through the prophets
of the Old Testament. For Philo, the unity of God was conceptually
maintained through the view that the Logos, like the matter of the
world, was created by God out of nothing.
Arius was also primarily concerned to “protect” the “oneness”
and simplicity of God and to “maintain” God’s separation from crea-
tion. Arius has a very similar conception of the Logos that was exhib-
ited in Philo. The one exception was that Arius identified the
preexistent Logos with the preexistent Christ. Arius conceptually
kept God’s unity safe by asserting that the existence of the Logos
began when:
prior to the creation of the world, God created it, like the creation of
anything else in the world, by will {theJesei), out of things
nonexistent (ex ouk onton), admitting, however...that, prior to its
entrance upon its second stage of existence, the Logos had
coexisted with God from eternity as a property of His essence.
One of the implications of this theory for the doctrine of God can
be found in what has been accorded to Arius’ pen. According to
Athanasius, Arius wrote in his Thalia that “God was not always Fa-
ther, but there was [a time] when God was alone (monon) and was
not yet Father, but afterwards He became Father. Arianism abol-
ishes the unity in the doctrine of the Trinity by declaring that the Son
is a creature of God and the Holy Spirit is a creature of the Son.
Unity is upheld in the one God by eliminating the Son and the Holy
Spirit from the equation.
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Augustine shared in the existential concerns of the Arians. The
doctrine of God should necessarily be one that stresses God’s unity,
unchangeability and distance from the contingencies of time. How-
ever, unlike Arius, Augustine also attempted to incorporate the Scrip-
tural witness of the divine Missions of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit
into his description of God. Augustine, therefore, had to find a solu-
tion that addressed the existential concerns of his generation which
did not relegate the Son and the Holy Spirit into the realm of
creaturehood.
In Book II of his De Trinitate, Augustine outlines a hermeneutical
principle or rule for searching Scripture that helps keep these con-
cerns in proper dialectical tension with one another. Augustine notes
that “some things in the Scriptures concerning the Father and the
Son are, therefore, put in such a way as to indicate the unity and
equality of the substance of the Father and the Son.”"^"^ At the same
time, he also recognizes that some Scripture passages “are so put as
to show that the Son is less on account of the form of a slave, that is,
on account of the creature with a changeable and human substance
that He assumed. In order to be able to make sense of these
seemingly contradictory statements from Scripture, Augustine cites
a principle that he has received from “learned Catholic interpreters”:
“that the Son of God is understood to be equal to the Father accord-
ing to the form of God in which He is, and less than the Father ac-
cording to the form of a slave that He has received. The failure to
apply this hermeneutical principle is at the root of the Arian heresy:
From this rule...not as giving us to understand that one is less than
the other, but only who is from whom, some have drawn another
meaning, as though it were said that the Son were less...To avoid
this, the rule we have just mentioned is to be observed, whereby it is
intimated that the Son is not less, but that He is of the Father: in
these words not His inequality but his birth is made known.
The hermeneutical rule is applied in order to understand, on the
one hand, the divine nature of the Son and, on the other, to relate
this divinity to the mission of the Son in time: “not his inequality but
his birth is made known.” Augustine attempted to combat Arianism
while, at the same time, address the pastoral and existential con-
cerns that Arianism attempted to meet. He does this by making a
conceptual distinction between God in Himself and God in Mission.
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This distinction is illustrated most clearly by the fact that Augustine
can write that Jesus can even be less than Himself, depending on
what “side” of the “rule” one is applying. Augustine comments on
Jesus’ status in his temporal Mission:
In this form He has been found to be not only less than the Father
but of the Holy Spirit as well, and not only that, but He has been
found to be even less than Himself, not of Himself who was, but of
Himself who is, because by the form of a slave which He received.
He did not lose the form of God...."^®
After setting up the distinction in the first place, Augustine is de-
liberate in making sure that no breach is fashioned in his under-
standing of God in eternity and God’s Mission in time. This concern
is illustrated in his discussion in Book 11 of De Trinitate^Nhen he speaks
of the sending of the Son or Word of God. Augustine asks whether
the sending of the Son at a particular time breaks the immutability of
the eternal God. He solves this apparent problem by “drawing” a
conceptual circle. When the Son was sent he was sent through a
Word of God. However, the Word of God is none other than the Son,
Himself. It is incomprehensible that God could be conceived of with-
out His Word or His Wisdom. The temporal sending of the Son
does not create a breach with the eternal relationship between Fa-
ther and Son.
The careful connecting of the theologia back to the oikonomia
is necessary to avoid the pitfalls of Arianism and to give proper weight
to the temporal Missions of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as pro-
claimed in Scripture. Arianism was a temptation for Augustine be-
cause he had to address the same existential concerns that the Ar-
ians had attempted to satisfy. After making sure that there should be
no conceptual breach between oikonomia and theoiogia, Augus-
tine returns to consider the themes of theoiogia:
But since the form of a slave was so assumed that the form of God
remained unchangeable, it is obvious that what became visible in
the Son was made by the Father and the Son who continued to be
invisible, that is, that the same Son Himself was sent so as to be
visible, by the invisible Father together with the invisible Son.^°
The sending of the visible^on is for the purpose of accomodating
the invisible Son to the eye5 of temporal life.^^ The history presented
in the oikonomia directs the observer to the unchangeable and in-
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visible God of eternity. The same structure is evident when Augustine
turns his attention towards the sending of the Holy Spirit. After recall-
ing the biblical accounts of the manifestation of the Spirit in the form
of a dove, with the sound of a violent wind and in the form of tongues
of fire, Augustine comments:
This operation, visibly manifested and offered to mortal eyes,
has been called the sending of the Holy Spirit, not as if His
essence itself had appeared in which He Himself is invisible
and unchangeable as the Father and the Son, but in the
hearts of men, being moved by these external signs, might be
turned away from the temporal manifestation of His coming
to the hidden eternity of Him who is forever present.^^
The relationship between oikonomia and theologia intersects
the soteriological concerns of humanity in such a way that the tem-
poral Mission is instrumental in moving the believer toward the eter-
nal life of the Trinity. A hierarchy between the oikonomia and the
theoiogia is established in the same way one arose in the distinction
between faith and truth.
Appropriation
The priority given to the immanent Trinity causes Augustine to
stress that there really is no incongruity between God’s operation in
time and God’s life in eternity. This is the problem that arises when
Augustine tries to explain the difference between the theophanies
described in the Old Testament and the Incarnation of Jesus Christ.
After reading through the various theophanies of the Old Testament
Augustine concludes that God can use any part of His creation as a
sign to point toward the ineffable. If the same principle is applied to
the Incarnation a docetic Christ would be the result. Also, such a
reading of the Incarnation would set up an incongruity between God’s
Mission and God’s life in eternity.
Augustine expends a great deal of literary energy examining the
Scriptural witness of various theophanies. In each case, he comes
to the conclusion that it is uncertain whether the one appearing
through some creature (i.e., fire, angel, wind, etc) is the Father, the
Son, the Holy Spirit or the Trinity itself. According to Colin Gunton,
this conclusion was in opposition to a long Latin tradition which at-
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tempted to identify the Old Testament theophanies as appearances of
Christ.^^ However, Augustine did make speculations about who actually
appeared in the individual theophanies. For instance, the appearance
of a pillar of fire that accompanied Israel out of Egypt suggests for
Augustine the Holy spirit who appeared in the tongues of fire at Pen-
tecost.^® Each time he makes these speculations he quickly reminds
his readers that his conclusions are only based on probable consid-
erations. What really matters is that the members of the Trinity are
joined in a common purpose.
At the end of his extended discussion concerning the theophanies,
Augustine concludes:
When God was said to appear to the Fathers of ancient times before
the coming of the Saviour,those voices and those corporeal forms
were wrought by angels. This holds true whether they themselves
spoke or did anything in the person of God...or whether they
assumed a form from a creature which they were not, in which God
was revealed to men in a symbolic manner.^^
Augustine continually reminds his readers that these “signs”
should not be confused with the “something” that is God. “Seeing”
God in his “substance” is reserved for the final salvation: “in order to
see this substance our hearts are cleansed through all those things
which are seen by our eyes and heard by our ears.”®® Since salvation
is a result of the proper work of the Son and the Holy Spirit, Augus-
tine concludes that the task is still ahead of him “to make clear the
difference between those appearances of ancient times and these
which are proper to the Son of God and the Holy Spirit, although the
latter were produced through a visible creature.”®^
This theological task returns to the question concerning the rela-
tive value Augustine places on oikonomia or theologia. Augustine
describes the human predicament in terms of distance from “eter-
nity” and uses the oikonomia to proclaim Christ as the Mediator of
this distance. This identification of Christ as the Mediator prevents
the hubris inherent in the attempts of humans to reach up to God
and also prevents the despair possible when human beings contem-
plate the great “distance” between them and God. The Father re-
veals the Son to avoid, on the one hand, that “through despair we
should not dare to be lifted up to Him”, and on the other, that “lest
being proud... of our own merits...and fail the more in our own
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strength. However, as was shown above, the language used to
describe the hope given to believers is of such a nature that it sets up
a conceptual structure which points beyond the Trinity of oikonomia
to the immanent Trinity.
Augustine uses the doctrine of trinitarian appropriation®^ to as-
sert his faith that there is no breach between the operations of the
Trinity in time and the life of the Trinity in eternity. Nevertheless, the
fact remains that Augustine’s approach to trinitarian metaphysics
somehow makes such a doctrine necessary in the first place. In
Edmund Hill’s discussion with Rahner, it was legitimate for him to
point toward Augustine’s use of this doctrine as his way of avoiding
an ultimate breach between the economic and immanent Trinities.
Augustine does indeed use “appropriation” in order to show that it is
the same God who is revealed in time that exists in eternity. More
precisely, Augustine writes in a variety of ways that the Trinity which
has been revealed in time points us in the direction of the Trinity of
eternity. This “pointing in the right direction” is the redemption that
is given to the believer now in faith.
However, the evidence that we have examined also suggests that
the doctrine of appropriation would not be necessary if Augustine
did not begin and end with a metaphysic which separates the imma-
nent Trinity from the economic Trinity. Catherine Mowry LaCugna
writes: “In contrast to Augustine’s theology, it is clear that if a theol-
ogy were to begin from and center itself on the economy, all the
while presupposing the essential unity of economy and ‘theology’, it
would have no need for a doctrine of appropriations.
Analogia entis
When Augustine describes his understanding of the existential
meaning of the human encounter with the revealing God he sets up
a distinction between faith and truth. At the same time, Augustine
also is diligent about explaining that while there might be a distinc-
tion between the two, faith and truth are not discordant with each
other. Similarly, in the interest of developing his understanding of
the doctrine of God that addresses the concerns of Arianism without
embracing its solution of conceiving the Son and the Holy Spirit as
creatures, Augustine sets up a distinction between God in Mission
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and God in Himself. He insists, however, that what can be observed
from the revealed God in Mission is not discordant with the eternal
will of God outside time.
Edmund Hill characterizes Augustine’s De Trinitate as a great
foundational work on the doctrine of God which operates between
two dialectical poles of humanity seeking God and God revealing
Himself.®^ Hill concludes that Augustine manages to maintain this
tension without collapsing these poles into some easy synthesis.
Augustine manages to do this by making distinctions while insisting
that what has been distinguished is, nevertheless, not in a discordant
relationship.
Trying to remain between these two poles, Augustine unearths a
vast variety of analogies that point to the revealing God. Along with
the analogous relationships that arose between truth and faith and
God in temporal Mission and God in eternity, Augustine establishes a
number of possible analogies between the Trinity and human per-
sonality. If humanity is indeed created in the image of God, Augus-
tine believes it is a justifiable activity to look for analogies of God in
human life. These analogies included: the unity of thinking, speak-
ing and willing; the lover, the beloved and the love between them;
memory, intelligence and will; mind, knowledge and love; or being,
knowing and willing. This variety is one that makes it impossible to
collapse the two poles of the seeking human and the revealing God
into any conceptual synthesis. God remains a mystery and at the
same time, the seeker is given a direction in which to look.
Augustine warns his congregation against the dangers of being
too anthropomorphic when applying some analogy from the realm
of human life to God.®^ This, however, is not a great danger in Au-
gustine’s explication of the Trinity. In fact, the greater danger in Au-
gustine’s conceptualization of God is that the various analogies that
he employs function to create a breach between the analogy and
Whom the analogy is designed to point toward.®® That Augustine is
aware of this danger is shown in his use of the doctrine of appropria-
tion.
Conclusion
When St. Augustine began his De Trinitate he made it clear that
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he did not consider it beneath his dignity to begin with faith in his
treatise on the Trinity. However, Augustine also understood faith in
relation to truth whereby faith was something that would eventually
be superceded by truth and presently pointed ahead toward truth.
This distinction between faith and truth was parallel to another dis-
tinction which Augustine made between the God of faith and the
God of truth. These distinctions were made in the interest of main-
taining what he considered to be the Scriptural witness of God as a
solution to the pastoral and existential concerns of the day. These
concerns of life caused people of Augustine’s time and place to search
for a unity or coherence outside the realm of chronos to give them
security and meaning. The analogies and the conceptual images
that Augustine used were in response to these concerns.
St. Augustine did indeed establish a conceptual distinction be-
tween the Trinity of oikonomia and the Trinity of theologia. There
were existential reasons for this distinction and Augustine was dili-
gent in attempting to show that while there might be a distinction
between the two they were not discordant with one another. He
wanted to maintain the mystery of God while at the same time insist-
ing that the Scriptures allowed one to say something about God that
could give a person hope. The temporal Missions of the Trinity dis-
couraged one from being proud in one’s knowledge of God and at
the same time prevented despair over the distance from God in eter-
nity and temporal life.®®
We have shown that Augustine’s doctrine of the Trinity strongly
prevented the believer from developing pride in the knowledge of
God. The distinction between the immanent and economic Trinity
prevented this. The question that remains is whether Augustine’s
theology on the Trinity is effective for preventing despair over the
distance between God-in-eternity and human temporal life.
In the language of the debate between Rahner and Hill, Augus-
tine does indeed establish a priority concerning the unity of God over
against the multiplicities of temporal life. This priority of the One
God is asserted over against the temporal Missions of the Trinity.
Augustine recognizes that it is harmful for Christian life to have a
conceptual breach between the Trinity of oikonomia and the Trinity
of theologia. Rahner’s solution is to avoid making a distinction be-
tween the two in the first place. Augustine, as Hill has pointed out
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over against Rahner, has a different solution. He makes the distinc-
tion but reconnects the two in the doctrine of appropriation. Augus-
tine’s solution is one that protects God’s unity and is a safeguard
against the establishment of temporal idols. This is done, however,
at the high cost of lessening the priority given to the Trinity of the
oikonomia.
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